Understanding Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) in
Armenia and Beyond

Executive Summary
Examining the evolution of Russian interference strategy following the invasion of Ukraine and
breaking down case studies from Armenia’s 2026 and Slovakia’s 2023 parliamentary elections,
communication patterns have exposed a new iteration of an already changed information
environment. Focusing on both elections, the emotional targeting and dissemination of
truth-based narratives marks the distinct shift away from disinformation, perpetuating a newly
emerging pattern of information manipulation over deliberate falsification.
Based on the report Foreign Influence and Information Manipulation in Armenia’s Electoral
Context: Assessing Russian Narratives, Networks, and Pre-Election Risks Ahead of the 7 June
Vote, co-authored by the Platform for Peace and Humanity and the Strategic Security Initiative
(SSI), the 9 June expert discussion responded to the Armenian election results in the context of
the Russian narrative and as the newest example in a growing pattern of attacks targeting
personal perception and societal insecurity. The webinar highlighted how contemporary
influence operations increasingly rely on coordinated narratives, emotional manipulation, and the
selective amplification of information, underscoring the need to strengthen democratic resilience
and better understand the evolving nature of FIMI.

FIMI: Redefining Information Strategy in Politics
Patterns and the Emergence of a Narrative-Based Framework
According to Mariam Gamdlishvili, Associate Director of SSI, the conceptualisation of Foreign
Information Manipulation and Interference emerged in response to the need to reclassify
information operations that aim to target social fear and personal perception of reality over the
creation of false information. Rooted in manipulation and emotional exploitation, FIMI marks
the shift from the dissemination of falsified information to a playbook on how governments can
best play with stories and emotions to alter civilians’ perception of reality and/or create disbelief
in the existence of truth.

The information-based attacks targeting democratic societies and the campaigns, both foreign
and domestic, surrounding Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine reveal contemporary influence
operations are no longer entirely dependent on the dissemination of and belief in lies. Rather, the
key determinant has become how well true or partially true, information can be selectively
presented and disproportionately amplified in ways so extreme it manipulates civilian’s
interpretation of facts and events.

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Gamdlishvili explained that the behavior-centric framework, FIMI, contrasts with previously
deployed disinformation tactics by influencing public perceptions and the collective psychology
of society. Notably, while disinformation strategies concentrate strongly on content, FIMI takes
advantage of how, by whom, what kind of methods and what the intention of this behaviour is
that can be changed and shaped.

Deconstructing the Strategy
Emotion-Based Manipulation and the Russian Objective
The Russian influence campaigns mentioned during the webinar show how these behavioural
techniques are implemented. Russia’s strategic objective in deploying consistently refined
iterations of the manipulation tactic in Eastern Europe and post-Soviet space is to undermine
social trust, regardless of what the trust was. Its strategy begins by eroding support for and belief
in institutions, elections, media, democratic processes, and public authorities. Its goal is not to
gain support for a single actor or decision but to create widespread confusion. Russia sees
systematic confusion and cynicism as disengagement from the system, whose implication is
democratic destabilisation.

These aspects help explain why the EU increasingly sees FIMI as a strategic security concern,
needing not only responses to disinformation but also, more broadly, actions to build democratic
resilience, institutional trust and electoral integrity. The ability to infiltrate, manipulate and
systematically eliminate support for democratic leaders by bypassing institutional systems and
circulating campaigns directly to the public shows that when the target is no longer the public's
opinion but their trust in the truth, democratic processes can rapidly be rendered meaningless.
The FIMI framework helps analysts and fact-checkers understand the extent to which narratives
can impact political engagement or allegiance and how deeply they can penetrate society.
Because the FIMI framework is behavioural, when societies face uncertainty, conflict, political
polarisation and economic stress, there is greater public attention on institutions and
emotion-based narratives become very powerful. Periods of electoral competition and political
transition are particularly vulnerable to the FIMI.

Russian Narratives in Armenia's Electoral Context
Russian Fear and the Strategic Objectives of Interference in the Armenian Election
Russia’s interference in Armenia’s 2026 election underscores the extent to which the Russian
government perceives a Westernising Armenia as a threat to Russian security. Policy analyst
Tigran Melikian from the Platform for Peace and Humanity stated that Russia attempted to
achieve its strategic objectives in Armenia through five key narratives. Russia told the story of
being Armenia’s indispensable security partner and of being the only state truly capable of
ensuring protection and that a vote favouring Westernization would be perceived as a declaration
of war that would make Armenia the next Ukraine. Additional narratives described Russia as the

sole defender of tradition and noble values, and as the connector to old orthodoxy. At the same
time, they warned that Armenia’s democratization and drift towards the West would cause the
following war and collapse.

According to the report, the primary strategic objective of preserving Russian influence was by
weakening democratic trust in Armenia and discouraging geopolitical diversification.
Russian-linked influence networks combined Telegram, Facebook, X, YouTube, TikTok paired
with artificial intelligence and coordinated reposting methods to cultivate a narrative of
geopolitical fatalism and psychological dependency. The narratives played upon existing security
concerns and vulnerabilities in Armenian society. As mentioned by Tigram, they presented the
EU and US as unable to give reliable security guarantees and played on fears of conflict, political
instability and discontent with Pashinyan’s weak leadership. Together, using these messages, the
Kremlin’s information apparatus sought to frame Armenia's geopolitical orientation as a binary
choice between Russia and the West.

Armenia's Geopolitical Realities
Strategic Constraints and Foreign Policy Choices
Thomas de Waal, Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe, continued the webinar’s discussion within
the broader geopolitical context of the South Caucasus, arguing that the Ukraine crisis and the
following establishment of a more multipolar regional order are gradually constraining Russia’s
influence in the region. Russia’s destabilisation campaigns in the post-Soviet space have less
effect than before. It is struggling to maintain its former influence in an increasingly multipolar
region where industrial competition and foreign political influence now also come from other
major regional and international powers, including Turkey, China, India, the EU, the United
States and the Gulf States.

At the same time, the speaker noted that Russia benefits from every possible impasse that could
arise in the region, such as, for example, the stalling of the peace process that remains due to
disagreements over Armenia's Constitution. The delay of the Armenia-Azerbaijan peace
agreement and the normalization of regional connectivity play in favor of Russian national
interests. Moreover, it places greater responsibility on Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Western states to
sustain momentum toward a lasting settlement and ensure the progress after the Karabakh War
won’t be lost.

However, apart from those impasses, there are also attempts to force favourable electoral
outcomes, such as a joint statement by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The
statement created a false choice dilemma for the Armenian electorate that proposed a referendum
for deciding whether Armenia would continue participating in the Eurasian Economic Union or
join the European Union. This decision has no practical element that can be acted upon and
exists only to highlight the extent of Armenia’s economic reliance on trade within the

Russian-dominated economic circle. Should such a referendum take place, the decision to leave
the Eurasian Economic Union would create a significant setback for the Armenian economy.

The Strategic Implications of Slovakia’s Election Moratorium
Blurring Reality and Controlling Information Access in an Election Period
While the focus of the webinar was the Armenian election, Jan Cingel, President and Founder of
Strategic Analysis, drew parallels with the 2023 parliamentary election in Slovakia to show how
similar information manipulation techniques have been adapted to different political contexts.
Notably, the Slovak elections in 2023 marked an important example in Russia’s information
operations evolution, transitioning from independent actors influencing the information
environment to a series of interconnected actors strategically manipulating the information field.
This election round serves as a case study in which pro-Russian actors exploited an existing legal
restriction to advance their interests abroad. They took advantage of Slovakia’s two-day election
moratorium to create a smear campaign of the opposition party, knowing they would be unable to
refute the narratives before voting began. The campaign exists as one of the first examples of
using deep-fake intelligence to sway an election.

In addition to artificial intelligence, analysis of the strategy deployed by the former economic
attaché at Russia’s Embassy in Bratislava during the 2023 election reveals how states and state
actors can pay influencers and platforms for network control, artificially enhancing engagement
with manipulated narratives. Through the purchase of bot farms and interconnected webs of fake
accounts, owning a majority share of the information space allows actors to rapidly increase
engagement and cross-platform sharing, generating greater public reactions by reaching larger,
targeted audiences. In both the Slovak and Armenian cases, the political contexts differed, but in
both cases contemporary FIMI showed an increasing reliance on coordinated networks, narrative
amplification and emotional manipulation to affect electoral structures and erode confidence in
democratic institutions.

Conclusion
Ultimately, the conversation demonstrated that the fight against FIMI is not just about spotting
misleading information or finding influence operations. As was underscored during the Q&A,
long-term resilience is about building democratic institutions, media literacy, independent
journalism and critical thinking so that societies are less vulnerable to manipulation.
The discussion also noted that information manipulation can be isolated from broader
geopolitical events, as influence operations are more and more intersecting with long-standing
regional conflicts and altering geopolitical dynamics. Using the 2026 Armenian election as well
as the 2023 Slovak election, this discussion deconstructed Russian objectives and methods for
influencing election outcomes. While the war in Ukraine constrains Russia’s military resources,
the speakers acknowledged that hybrid influence operations will continue to be a vital tool of

Russian foreign policy and that international collaboration and institutional resilience will need
to be fostered.

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Prepared by Sydney SHEINFELD and Muraz Safoev