International Law O'Clock: Is the Prohibition on the Use of Force Meaningless?

Photo: OpenAI

By Konstantina Zivla

The question is no longer whether the prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) is technically in force - it is. The question is whether it remains meaningful in a world where three permanent members of the Security Council appear willing to abandon it, and where the Council itself is paralysed by the veto system. 

The short answer is: No, it is not meaningless. But it is no longer the rigid, inviolable wall it was designed to be. It has become a contested fence, constantly being climbed, tunnelled under, or reinterpreted by those with the power to do so. Its meaning has shifted from a guarantee of peace to a battleground of legitimacy.

Contemporary conflicts increasingly operate below the threshold of conventional warfare, exploiting legal ambiguities surrounding attribution, sovereignty, and the definition of armed attack. These developments have prompted scholars to question whether the prohibition on the use of force still retains meaningful legal authority or has been progressively eroded by modern methods of warfare. Yet, to declare the prohibition "meaningless" is to ignore the most critical evidence of its survival: the behaviour of the aggressors themselves.

Even as Russia wages a full-scale, unprovoked war in Ukraine and keeps Ukrainian territory under illegal occupation and annexation, while China intimidates neighbours in the South China Sea, none of these powers argues that Article 2(4) is dead. They do not claim a license to conquer. Instead, they engage in a frantic backward calculation, framing their actions as falling under exceptions (e.g. Self-Defence under Art. 51) or arguing their operations do not constitute "force" in the legal sense.

This diplomatic “theatre” proves the norm's enduring weight. The large number of condemnations by the international community, especially through UN General Assembly resolutions such as the Emergency Special Session Resolution ES-11/1, demonstrates that most states still regard the prohibition of the use of force as a basic rule of international law [and Jus Cogens norm!]. States that violate the rule often face sanctions, political condemnation, and diplomatic isolation. More importantly, even aggressor states still try to justify their actions rather than openly reject the law. This shows that Article 2(4) of the UN Charter still remains the main standard of legitimacy. If the law were truly meaningless, there would be no need for the pretense.

Nevertheless, Hathaway and Patrick (2025) warn that the problem today is the weakening of this “pretense.” In the past, states that violated international law still tried to present legal arguments to defend their actions. Today, some states (e.g., Russia) commit obvious violations and offer weak, unconvincing explanations. This does not render the law meaningless. Instead, it shows that respect for the rule is weakening. A major reason for this is the “double standard” in international politics. Smaller states are often expected to obey the law, while powerful states are able to act more freely. Even so, the rule still has influence. States continue to fear international criticism, economic sanctions, and diplomatic isolation. Such constraints on realpolitik are essential when legal provisions have proven to be a dead letter. 

Returning to the central question: Is the prohibition on the use of force meaningless? No. It remains one of the most important protections against a return to a world of conquest and power politics. Although it is often violated, it still provides the basic framework for a rules-based international order.

To call the prohibition meaningless would amount to accepting a world in which power alone determines outcomes. The real challenge for contemporary international law is not to abandon the system, but to improve and strengthen it so it can respond to the realities of the twenty-first century. The system may be weakened, but it still stands, and the international community must work to protect it before it collapses.

The question then arises: what steps should be taken forward? How ought states and policymakers respond to these violations? It is a difficult question to answer, yet one that should not discourage the pursuit of solutions. The UN possesses no global police force. Therefore, violations of the Charter are addressed through a blend of diplomacy, sanctions, international courts, and political pressure. 

But herein lies the central challenge: this is a reactive model of enforcement, one that too often “closes the stable door after the horse has bolted”, rather than preventing conflict before it escalates. The focus must therefore shift towards a proactive system of accountability, grounded in preventive diplomacy and early intervention at the first signs of tension. Only then can the UN Charter function as more than merely “a law without teeth”. 

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Konstantina Zivla is Fellow at Defense and Military Affairs Program of the Strategic Security Initiative (SSI)