Splitting the Atoms, Not the Alliance: Turkey, Russia, and Akkuyu Power Plant

This September, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) conference in Bishkek marks the latest development in the decade-long cooperation on the Akkuyu nuclear power plant (NPP) deal between Russia and Turkey. The heads of state used the sidelines of the summit to emphasize their commitment to strengthening the cooperation. This partnership signals that Akkuyu NPP is not a one-time project, but arguably, rather a long-term foundation of Russian energy and industrial presence in Turkey. More importantly, Turkey’s role in this partnership has a dual function, as it is both energy-dependent on Russia and a NATO member state. Thus the partnership has  implications that extend beyond a bilateral energy agreement and into a security-driven matter for the wider Black Sea region (WBS), with the Southern Caucasus as an integral part of it for this analysis. Therefore, this brief argues that the Akkuyu NPP is a tool of hedging for Turkey, in which it secures its energy and bargaining power without altering its NATO commitments. The broader perspective thus suggests indirect but valuable implications for the wider Black Sea region and the alliance, as they depend on future decision-making of both Turkey and Russia. 

What does the Akkuyu NPP Deal Entail? 

The Akkuyu project can be traced back to 2010, when the two states signed an agreement on constructing and operating the NPP, making it Turkey’s first  nuclear power plant, located on the coast of the Mediterranean sea (Akkuyu Nuclear, 2018).  As provided on the official website of the NPP project, the “Akkuyu power plant is going to cover 10% of our nation’s [Turkey] entire power demand,” Erdogan commented (Akkuyu Nuclear, 2018). Although the Akkuyu Nuclear JSC company was founded in Turkey, Rosatom (a Russian company) retains full ownership of the NPP, under a  build-own-operate mechanism, unlike other nuclear energy transfer deals. This gives Russia not only equity and operational authority in Turkey of its critical infrastructure, but also a significant strategic leverage, solidifying its aim to ensure presence in the region. Despite the ownership, the Akkuyu NPP nonetheless operates under Turkish licensing, laws, and regulations, and complies with the IAEA safeguards and requirements (IAEA, 2022).

The Turkish Parliament passed legislation that exempts Rosatom from relevant taxes and fees until 2045, which further benefits the company (Kenez, 2026). The Turkish opposition claims that this provision could result in tax incentives worth $5 billion, which is why they have opposed the aforementioned law (Kenez, 2026). Despite their ongoing opposition to the project, the Akkuyu NPP is projected to provide Russia with $2–3 billion, despite the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West. The alliance highlights regional security concerns in the midst of volatile international relations. 

Akkuyu and Russia-Turkey Relations Revisiting: Russia-Turkey Relations

Relations between Turkey and Russia have been characterized by a balance of competition and cooperation, with consideration of their long-standing history and dynamics within the region (Ülgen, 2024). It is, however, more significant to examine what role the NPP deal plays within this framework. For Turkey, Akkuyu serves several interests: energy security, industrial development, and geopolitical status. Although historically rivals, the two states have increased their ties in the trade and energy sectors, with arguably similar political incentives over the last two decades (Svarin, 2016). Notably, the argument of competition and counterbalance between Russia and Turkey shall be linked to each development within or beyond the region, which affects their strategic alliance (Sabanadze and Dalay, 2025). To link these back to the new NPP deal, Akkuyu in a way fits this pattern, in which cooperation would be pursued as it serves separate interests and is not derived from an underlying alignment of the two states. Therefore, Rosatom’s ownership of the NPP gives Russia a regional leverage within the WBS, as Turkey obtains energy security, which would further underline Turkey’s hedging aims. 

Further Implications on the (Wider) Black Sea Region

Great Power Competition and Regional Security

An NPP is a civilian energy asset and may look harmless against developments in the political realm. However, its positioning clearly suggests Russia’s ambition to remain a hegemon within the region despite isolation, sanctions, and an ongoing war in Ukraine, as Russia seeks to protect its power even beyond its closest territorial neighbours, considering the location of Akkuyu (Sabanadze and Dalay, 2025). Moreover, the wider Black Sea region has already been subject to Russian military interventions with Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, as well as a sustained military presence in Syria since 2015 until the fall of Assad regime (Sabanadze and Dalay, 2025). Thus, the (wider) Black Sea region becomes a ground for Russian foreign policy projections beyond its immediate territorial neighbours, where it arguably uses the energy infrastructure and company ownership in Turkey as a tool instead of a sole military operation. Thus, as suggested, the deal could affect dynamics within littoral and neighboring states, where Ukraine, Georgia, Romania, and Bulgaria have an important role in the Black Sea security dimension. Although Akkuyu is located in the south of Turkey, while not geographically directly connected, this adds another degree of concern and complexity within the region. 

Turkey’s NATO Membership

The nuclear energy cooperation raises more questions regarding security concerns than anticipated. Whereas Russia’s priority of keeping the region away from Western influence is not a novel argument, this is where Turkey’s and Russia’s interests would coincide (Sabanadze and Dalay, 2025). NATO possesses the legal personality as an international organization to enter treaties. While it is not a party to arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation legal framework, NATO actively contributes to consultations and cooperation on these issues (NATO, 2026). Therefore, Turkey, as a NATO member state, would have to utilize its own national obligations as a non-nuclear weapons state party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty under IAEA safeguards. The Akkuyu deal does not include nuclear weapons or arms-related matters, and does not signal defence cooperation. This further does not undermine the role of NATO and Turkey’s long-standing membership, in regard to the Russian-owned nuclear energy infrastructure. However, it may be crucial to follow the developments of Russian-Turkish relations as they are on the road to completing the NPP, since Akkuyu could be a concern for NATO in indirect ways, namely trust within the alliance and security of the critical civilian infrastructure. 

Another angle worth looking into while assessing the implications of the deal within the region is the Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Straits (1936), which gives Turkey the authority to allow passage of warships and in wartime to close the straits to belligerent vessels. This legal text gives Turkey a chance to strengthen its policy and simultaneously constrain it by limiting options of outside powers and providing Turkey with  bargaining power. The West has encouraged Turkey to reframe the Convention for an improved facilitation of Western access to the Black Sea (Sabanadze and Dalay, 2025). Growing nuclear energy partnership with Russia precludes such reinterpretation of Montroux. The convention, therefore, continues to function as a strong legally binding instrument, while also providing an asset that Turkey can operate in. Therefore, in the current volatile security environment in the region, while both Ukraine and Russia are crucial partners in military or energy agreements, Turkey, as a NATO member state, is rather constrained (Ozerdem, 2022). This could further be a cautious signal within the region and the foreign policy of the neighbouring states. 

Conclusion

The Akkuyu NPP deal, now reaffirmed at the September SCO summit, illustrates how the actors’ decision-making on nuclear energy impacts regional security. Some structural tools drive these implications: Turkey’s dual role as a strategic partner on nuclear energy with Russia and a NATO member state, as well as Russia’s extended presence in the region through non-military means of projecting great power aims. The deal further establishes technological, operational, and energy control, while providing benefits for Turkey. However, in parallel, these developments question the role of the Western allies within the Black Sea region and the next steps in ensuring cooperative security measures. On the other hand, it is still unclear how NATO allies and other (wider) Black Sea states will respond in case the partnership deepens in the future.

Photo: Strana Rosatom

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By Natia Ninoshvili, Lead for Nuclear Strategy, SSI