United We Stand? The Future of Transatlantic Security After Warsaw
The 2026 Warsaw Security Forum, which brought political leaders, military commanders and security experts to the Polish capital on October 12-13, sharpened a question that has hung over European security since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine: can the transatlantic Alliance adapt to a more demanding strategic environment without weakening the political and military cohesion that has protected the continent for more than seven decades? Over two days of debate on NATO’s future, the war in Ukraine, European defence capabilities, hybrid threats and the shifting international order, participants agreed that Europe’s security challenges can no longer be managed through declarations of solidarity alone. However, the attention given to Europe’s capacity to defend itself, and to the durability of American engagement, also exposed an unresolved tension between the need for Europeans to assume greater responsibility and the need to preserve transatlantic unity. The forum mattered not because it suggested that Europe should replace American leadership, but because it clarified the conditions under which the Alliance can remain credible, cohesive and capable through a prolonged period of strategic competition.
The first of those conditions is military effectiveness. The European defence debate has moved beyond how much governments spend to the more important question of what that spending produces. European capitals have raised defence budgets and committed substantial resources to Ukraine, but money does not automatically become deployable forces, adequate ammunition stocks, integrated air and missile defence, resilient logistics or the industrial capacity needed for high-intensity warfare. NATO Deputy Secretary General Radmila Shekerinska made this point when she described strong defence as “a prerequisite for our security” and named capability investment and the defence-industrial base as central priorities for the Alliance. The task is to ensure that national investments add up to a coherent collective-defence posture not to a patchwork of capabilities scattered across separate national planning and procurement systems.
General Alexus Grynkewich, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe, gave this focus on operational credibility its sharpest expression. In the most anticipated address of the forum, he publicly outlined for the first time a “Theory of Victory” already endorsed by all 32 Allies. It rests on three successive actions: blocking an initial attack, blunting it if it persists and, “if required,” breaking “the operational warfighting system arrayed against us.” Declaring that “if attacked, we are ready to fight tonight,” he concluded: “We will, in short, ensure any attack, against any Ally, proves utterly futile.” The formulation matters beyond its message to Moscow and reflects an understanding that credible collective defence requires the ability not only to deny an adversary its immediate objectives but also to dismantle the command, logistics and support systems that sustain aggression. Such an approach depends on elements that remain unevenly developed across the Alliance: integrated capabilities, reliable command arrangements, industrial preparedness and the political will to act together under pressure.
It also follows that burden-sharing should not be reduced to a comparison of national defence budgets or a ledger of European versus American contributions. A better measure is whether European investment strengthens NATO’s ability to execute its defence plans and closes the vulnerabilities an adversary might exploit. Greater European capacity can make the Alliance more effective and ease the disproportionate demands on American forces. However, that benefit depends on interoperability, common operational planning and sustained coordination with the United States. European defence efforts are therefore most valuable when they reinforce the collective system, and least valuable when they encourage parallel arrangements whose relationship with NATO remains unclear.
And this distinction raises the question of institutional cohesion, which the language of strategic autonomy often obscures. The European Union has important tools for financing capability development, supporting defence production, regulating critical technologies and strengthening societal resilience, while NATO remains the essential framework for collective defence, military planning and deterrence. In principle these roles complement each other. In practice, national procurement preferences, divergent threat perceptions and industrial rivalry continue to hinder the development of capabilities European forces can use together. An excessive emphasis on institutional independence also risks diverting attention from operational requirements, particularly where European forces still rely on American strategic enablers and Allied command structures. The forum’s annual report offered a constructive answer by placing the Nordic-Baltic-Polish group at the centre of Europe’s future security order. These states share direct exposure to Russian military pressure and hybrid activity, and their cooperation can accelerate practical coordination, provided it reinforces wider Allied planning rather than developing alongside it.
At the same time, the most politically consequential issue in Warsaw was the durability of American engagement. Asked about doubts among some Allies, Grynkewich pointed to July’s NATO summit in Ankara, where Washington reaffirmed its “ironclad commitment to Article 5.” Yet his assurances coincided with reports that a Pentagon review due on 6 November is weighing the withdrawal of between 25,000 and 40,000 of the roughly 80,000 American troops in Europe. That is a sobering backdrop for a strategy that relies heavily on US ground forces. Opening the forum, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk warned that Moscow wants to restore “Russian dominance” to its pre-1989 extent and insisted that “the path to peace does not lie through weakness.” He said that message must be heard “from Warsaw to Washington.” The juxtaposition shows that European spending alone cannot settle doubts about American commitment, because the relationship ultimately rests on shared threat assessments, political trust and a mutual recognition that American and European security cannot be separated. European dependence without capability creates vulnerability, but doubt about American resolve erodes deterrence just as surely.
None of these questions can be separated from the war in Ukraine. Ukraine’s resistance shapes the security environment on NATO’s Eastern Flank, and the war outcome will influence Moscow’s future military posture and its willingness to coerce its neighbours. Therefore, continued support for Kyiv is an investment in the credibility of European security, not merely an act of solidarity. Grynkewich acknowledged that the Alliance is “learning a tonne from Ukrainian partners,” and President Volodymyr Zelensky, addressing the forum by video, urged Washington to apply “real pressure” on Moscow rather than offer concessions. At the same time, recurring incidents of sabotage, arson and drone incursions on the eastern flank showed that deterrence cannot be limited to conventional forces. Activities below the threshold of armed conflict deliberately exploit the gaps between military and civilian responsibilities and between national authorities, NATO and the EU. An architecture that strengthens conventional deterrence while neglecting these vulnerabilities would remain incomplete.
Warsaw did not resolve the central dilemmas of European security, but it made their interdependence unmistakable. Military readiness, European investment, institutional coordination, support for Ukraine and American engagement are not separate policy files. Together they answer one question: whether NATO can sustain credible deterrence in an increasingly contested environment. Europe’s growing responsibility for its own defence should therefore be judged by whether it strengthens collective capabilities, deepens interoperability and sustains a common strategic purpose. A stronger European contribution can help preserve the transatlantic bond, but only as a complement to NATO not an alternative to it. The real test of whether the Allies can stand united is whether the United States and Europe can redistribute their roles while keeping the trust, shared priorities and institutional cohesion on which collective defence depends. In a period of prolonged strategic competition, unity cannot be assumed, it must be earned continually through practical cooperation and a clear recognition that the security of Europe and the United States remains fundamentally intertwined.
Photo: Warsaw Security Forum
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By Megi Benia, Founding Director of SSI