When Deterrence Becomes Disruption: Nuclear Signaling as a Hybrid Threat

Nuclear influence has moved beyond its launch button and nuclear weapons no longer need to be deployed to reshape global security. A range of non-kinetic measures can now alter political calculations, generate strategic anxiety, and erode international legal frameworks without triggering the threshold of an armed conflict. Deterrence postures of Nuclear weapons states (NWSs) are also visibly changing with nuclear spending on the rise, as geopolitical competition persists, and arms control agreements collapse. Nuclear signaling thus becomes a powerful tool of hybrid coercion and ambiguity. 

This topic has gained urgency in recent years. The New START Treaty expired on February 5, 2026, leaving the last key bilateral U.S.-Russia arms control framework without a successor or formal negotiations underway. In Europe, France is reasserting its nuclear position with the new dissuasion avancée (forward deterrence) doctrine, including plans for growing and modernizing its nuclear stockpile. The latest NPT Review Conference (Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Review Conference) concluded without reaching a consensus, illustrating changes in efforts, as well as current attitudes towards non-proliferation and disarmament.

The NWSs are bound by one of the key legal instruments, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations of non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. Yet, a growing contradiction between state behavior and legal responsibilities undermines the nuclear regime and prompts states to adopt policies that suit their objectives.   

Nuclear Signaling as a Hybrid Instrument

The intention is not merely the use of nuclear weapons, as the consequences remain severe and irreversible for any rational state to treat deployment as an option. Alternatively, a question arises as to whether deterrence or signaling keeps us safer.

This notion grants the ability to states to possess escalation dominance, in which the NWSs can project a tremendous amount of power through agitation and coercion, without the use of weapons. The result normalizes nuclear anxiety, complicates decision-making, and allows major powers to pursue their own interests while stalling common security mechanisms through material and discursive signaling. Therefore, nuclear signaling as a hybrid tool thrives on ambiguity and these methods serve as revisionist tools with offensive over defensive goals, through violations of sovereignty and expansionism.

Although the risk of escalation looms, verification systems and legal obligations continue to stabilize these factors, albeit in an asymmetric manner. There is still room for NWSs to pursue their interests and operate within the legal and normative limits they ratified. However, existing mechanisms constrain state behaviour to the extent to which they are bound by international legal instruments. This condition is precisely what makes signaling an effective hybrid method. 

The Anatomy of Contemporary Nuclear Signaling

Signaling can be identified in various forms. Understanding its structure and aim requires examining how states shape discourse, their strategic posture, and develop capabilities. When employed as hybrid tools, signaling becomes rather difficult to counter but likely to be predictable and detectable. 

Discursive signaling relies on rhetoric that fosters the sense of unease and constant fear of further escalation of conflicts. For instance, Russia has repeatedly invoked references of “catastrophic consequences” since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, with studies tracing each signal between Russia and the West since 2022. In fact, in South Asia, India and Pakistan have also employed similar tools. The 2025 conflict between the two nuclear armed states  held significance due to the heightened misinformation and disinformation, albeit lower nuclear signaling compared to previous conflicts between India and Pakistan. However, the recent event in the region still demonstrated that nuclear signaling and deterrence practices worked and reminded the rest of the NWSs of their posture within the realm.

Postural signaling includes exercises and alerts that blur the line of state intent. In 2025, Trump ordered to revive nuclear testing prior to his meeting with Xi Jinping in an interview. Bearing in mind that the U.S. signed and never ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, whilst Russia and China have been accused of low-yield nuclear tests. Paired with the adjusted and advanced plans for the European deterrence, France aims to extend its defense systems which bolster the nuclear signaling notion. These examples of assertive postural signaling amplify emerging hybrid threats within the international realm and incentives of NWSs, ergo placing pressures on international norms.

Material signaling is currently seen in the rapid growth of nuclear triads among NWSs, including plans for modernization of their stockpile. The United States Department of Defense has assessed China’s growing and developed Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), capable of reaching the U.S.  China’s projection to double its nuclear triad by 2030, and the U.S. investing in the development of its systems, constitute signals of long-term strategic commitments of global powers. Notably, as the recent prognosis stands, the trend of increasing operational nuclear warheads is likely to increase, while nuclear-capable states would be less transparent regarding their arsenal and numbers. Under these tools, a state does not need to issue a threat to signal their position.

As indicated, nuclear signaling takes place across dimensions, making its main goal to intimidate the Western hemisphere without shooting. This allows for an easier approach because it confuses state purpose and causality and, in certain cases, requires little to no mobilisation.

What Drives Nuclear Signaling? 

There are several interconnected factors that drive the turn to hybrid threats. Given a classic security dilemma, the pattern becomes recognizable, where if one state modernizes, it triggers another’s expansion efforts, cycle of actions and reactions to the policies. While states resort to nuclear signalling as a hybrid tool, it only becomes an attractive and a safer method of asserting power. As a result, uncertainty on a strategic level is persistent. We can only expect further polarisation among these states, where instead of direct intervention, vague and asymmetric methods of warfare are being used.

Nuclear signalling is driven by a variety of factors, including geopolitical objectives, national and/or foreign policy interests and the idea of power projection. However, one thing is evident: nuclear signalling fosters polarisation among NWSs and exacerbates mistrust on regional and international levels. Ultimately, these discurses and actions risk erosion of common security principles, whilst those hybrid threats become a tool of geopolitical bargaining.

Implications for the Nuclear Order and the Road Ahead 

The global norms of non-use, disarmament and test-ban initiatives are under pressure due to the complex nature of hybrid threats and security resilience. Therefore, there is a risk that this will become a competitive and uncertain environment. The real test and challenge lies in strengthening norms and mechanisms that constrain such ambiguous tactics.

Looking ahead, the following years will highlight efforts of bilateral and multilateral agreements, enhanced verification technologies and collective, peaceful attitudes on the matter. Rebuilding trust among actors could mitigate further risks associated with the nuclear and hybrid threats context. Ultimately, through nuclear signaling as a hybrid tool, states pursue objectives in the grey zone, which disrupts the post-Cold War arms control and nuclear order, established and strengthened by international legal frameworks. Addressing this would require a revised commitment to shared peace and security principles among nuclear-capable states and beyond.

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By Natia Ninoshvili - Fellow of Hybrid Threats and Resilience Program at the Strategic Security Initiative (SSI)

Photo: OpenAI