Occupied Without Annexation: Belarus Inside Russia's War Machine

On June 19, Volodymyr Zelensky issued an ultimatum, giving Alexander Lukashenko one week. Four relay stations were identified on the territory of Belarus, in the regions of Gomel and Brest, installed on communications towers, which are normally used to guide Russian Shahed and Geran drones through their final approach vectors towards Volyn, Rivne and Zhytomyr. These stations have been operating since the second half of 2025, and it was in March 2026 when intelligence communities of Ukraine and its partners finally confirmed four such stations, with reports emerging of Russia planning to deploy additional equipment. Zelensky’s message to Lukashenko was straightforward: remove the equipment, or Ukraine would. By June 22, the stations were not operating anymore.

Even though Lukashenko never publicly responded to Zelensky's ultimatum, the Kremlin did, accusing Kyiv of violating Belarusian sovereignty and escalating tensions. This response was revealing in itself. By invoking the language of sovereignty and selectively appealing to international law, Russia sought to portray Ukraine's efforts to neutralize an active component of its strike infrastructure as an act of aggression against Belarus. The accusation was therefore not simply diplomatic rhetoric but an exercise in lawfare, using legal narratives to shield Russian military capabilities while complicating Ukraine's ability to respond. Putin and Lukashenko subsequently met to discuss Zelensky's warning, coordinating their response after the relay stations had been exposed.  

This episode crystallizes a question that many Western policymakers have been asking, but in entirely the wrong way. Contemporary debates about whether Belarus will enter the war against Ukraine portray it as a bystander with a choice to make, when in reality it has long been an active participant in Russia’s aggression. The real question, therefore, is not whether Belarus will enter the war, but why its sustained participation has carried so few political and economic costs.

Nowhere is Belarus’s integration into Russia’s war effort more evident than in the military-industrial sphere. More than 80% of Belarusian enterprises are participating in fulfilling Russian state defense orders. Up to 500 Belarusian companies were integrated into Russian military-industrial complex system, participating in production and providing up to 500,000 artillery and rocket shells in a year, while at the same time, Russia is considering building a factory for drones in Belarus, with the capability to reach 100,000 units annually. Despite the hesitation by Western policy-makers to designate Russia’s co-belligerents in its aggressive war against Ukraine, Kyiv has imposed sanctions on specific Belarusian enterprises that were responsible for producing 122mm and 152mm artillery shells for Russian occupying forces. These are the very munitions used on the frontlines and in strikes against Ukrainian cities, and more importantly, the factories producing them are located in Minsk.

The same pattern is evident in the energy sector. In 2026, Russia’s imports of Belarusian gasoline have increased thirteenfold, while diesel imports tripled. As Ukrainian strikes degraded Russia’s refining capacity, Belarus helped offset those losses by supplying fuel critical to sustaining Russia's war economy. Beyond economic support, this arrangement also increased Russia's resilience by externalizing part of its energy infrastructure to a formally non-belligerent state.

The relay stations demonstrate that Belarus's role extends well beyond logistics. They formed part of the communications architecture supporting Russian long-range drone operations against Ukraine, enabling two-way data transmission during strikes. Belarusian territory therefore became an operational component of Russia's strike network. By routing critical infrastructure through Belarus, Russia complicates Ukrainian responses, since any attempt to neutralize these assets risks being portrayed as an attack on a state that is not formally at war.  

None of this represents a new Russian approach as it has long relied on proxy territories and dependent states to project military power while preserving political deniability. What is new is the scale of Belarus's integration into Russia's war effort and the continued reluctance of Western governments to acknowledge it. Although sanctions have targeted Belarusian entities, the country has largely escaped treatment as a co-belligerent.

The 20^th sanctions package adopted by the European Union in April 2026 reflected this ambiguity. While it imposed measures on Belarusian entities supplying dual-use goods to Russia's defense industry, it continued to frame Belarus as merely facilitating Russia's aggression rather than participating in it directly. Such an approach narrows the available policy response and allows Belarus to preserve a degree of plausible deniability despite providing industrial capacity, strategic territory, energy resources, and military infrastructure essential to Russia's war.

Fundamentally, the relay station episode showcases that it is the direct pressure from Ukraine, not Western sanctions, that are more effective in acting as deterrents to Russia’s capabilities. The period between Zelensky’s ultimatum on June 19, and subsequent "retreat” of Belarus on June 22, demonstrates that no Western government in these eighteen months of active Belarusian facilitation has managed to produce the same productive outcome that Ukrainians have in a matter of several days.

Western governments should therefore reassess Belarus's role. The country no longer functions just as Russia's closest ally but as an operational extension of its war machine. That reality warrants treating Belarus as a co-belligerent, expanding sectoral sanctions on its defense industry, and imposing secondary sanctions on firms that continue supporting its military-industrial complex.

For the Kremlin, Belarus provides strategic control without the political costs of formal annexation. For Belarus, the price is the progressive erosion of its sovereignty. As Lukashenko's political future becomes increasingly uncertain, the more important question is not whether Belarus will remain involved in Russia's war, but whether this loss of strategic autonomy will outlast his rule and become a permanent feature of the Russian-Belarusian relationship.

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By Nicholas Chkhaidze - Fellow of Hybrid Threats and Resilience Program at the Strategic Security Initiative (SSI)

Photo: OpenAI