Resilience as Power: Strategic Communication and Security in Small States

In recent years the nature of security transformed. Contemporary threats increasingly extend beyond conventional military confrontation, targeting institutions, societies, and democratic processes through disinformation, cyberattacks, political interference, and other forms of hybrid activity. Rather than seeking immediate territorial gains, such threats frequently aim to undermine public trust, weaken institutional legitimacy, and exploit societal vulnerabilities. n this context, resilience is understood as the capacity of institutions and societies to anticipate, absorb, adapt to, and recover from disruptive shocks while maintaining their essential functions.  As recent European and transatlantic security debates increasingly indicate, resilience has consequently emerged as a central component of national security, enabling states not only to recover from crises but also to withstand sustained external pressure while preserving institutional effectiveness, democratic governance, and societal cohesion.

Strategic communication is understood not merely as government messaging or public diplomacy, but as the coordinated use of communication, narratives, transparency, and public engagement to advance national objectives and strengthen societal resilience. Rather than functioning solely as a reactive communication activity, strategic communication aligns words, actions, and policies in order to build public trust, reinforce institutional legitimacy, counter disinformation and hostile information activities, and shape the information environment in support of national security objectives. Within this framework, strategic communication is treated not simply as a communication function but as an integral component of resilience-building and national security strategy.

These developments are presenting considerable issues for small states in particular. Limited military capabilities, geopolitical exposure, economic dependence, and asymmetric relations with larger powers frequently constrain their ability to rely exclusively on traditional forms of deterrence. At the same time, the international system is becoming increasingly fragmented, shaped by intensifying great-power competition and declining institutional predictability. Under such conditions, multilateral frameworks alone no longer guarantee security, prosperity, or political autonomy. The agency of small states increasingly depend not only on hard power, but on resilience, diversified partnerships and networked collaboration to navigate asymmetric vulnerabilities and extended uncertainty.

The strategic environment of small states has grown more fragmented and uncertain, that has significantly changed how they navigate security and autonomy. Intensifying great-power competition, pressure on multilateral institutions, and the growing weaponisation of economic and technological interdependence have reduced the protective capacity of traditional international frameworks. Small states must increasingly navigate structural dependencies, asymmetric vulnerabilities, and extended strategic uncertainty. Under these conditions, resilience has become essential not only for managing external shocks but also for preserving political agency, maintaining institutional legitimacy, and sustaining strategic autonomy in an increasingly contested international order.

In an era, where hybrid threats are increasingly operating within the informational and cognitive domains, this connection becomes particularly significant. Nowadays,  security challenges not only to disrupt physical infrastructure but also influence beliefs, shape public perceptions, manipulate decision-making, exploit political polarization, weaken democratic legitimacy, and erode trust in institutions. Rather than relying solely on conventional military force, hostile actors increasingly employ disinformation campaigns, foreign information manipulation, cyber-enabled influence operations, and other hybrid instruments designed to affect how societies perceive reality and respond to crises. This has given increasing prominence to the concept of cognitive resilience, understood as the capacity of individuals and societies to recognise, resist, and recover from information manipulation while maintaining trust in democratic institutions and informed decision-making. In such environments, security can no longer be understood exclusively through military preparedness or territorial defence but must also include the protection of the cognitive and informational space in which public confidence and democratic resilience are formed.

The significance of strategic communication is expanding as a key component of national security and resilience-building. By strengthening public trust, fostering narrative coherence, and countering disinformation and manipulation, strategic communication helps sustain societal resilience in conditions of uncertainty and external pressure. For small states, resilience increasingly functions as a form of strategic power, while strategic communication serves as one of the key mechanisms through which that power is sustained.

For small states, strategic communication plays an important role in preserving resilience under conditions of vulnerability. Unlike strong powers that are capable of using more military or economic leverage, small countries frequently have to rely on institutional legitimacy, adaptability, and public trust to withstand external pressure. In this context, resilience becomes essential not only for security, but also for maintaining political agency and internal stability. Through disinformation, manipulated narratives, and political polarization, external actors often seek to weaken trust in institutions and deepen internal divisions. As a result, national resilience increasingly depends not only on defence capabilities, but also on the ability of states to maintain public confidence and resist manipulation. Strategic communication is part of this process by building trust, supporting reliable public messaging and countering disinformation.The experiences of several small states further demonstrate how strategic communication contributes to resilience in practice.

Finland provides one of the strongest examples of how strategic communication can strengthen resilience in small states. Finland adopted a comprehensive “whole of society” approach to national preparedness, because of its geopolitical proximity to Russia and longstanding security concerns, integrating state institutions, civil society, businesses, and citizens in resilience building initiatives. A central element of this approach is psychological resilience, supported through media literacy, public preparedness, and transparent communication. Finland emphasizes how strategic communication can contribute public awareness and social resilience against misinformation and external influence rather than crisis communication.  

In response to growing concerns over foreign influence, disinformation, and hybrid threats, in 2022, Sweden established  Psychological Defence Agency. This Agency  identify, analyse, and respond to hostile information activities targeting to democratic institutions and public trust. The Swedish approach recognises that modern security threats often affect perceptions and deepen social divisions rather than use conventional force. In this context, strategic communication functions not only as crisis communication, but as a preventive mechanism designed to strengthen democratic resilience, maintain public confidence, and reduce societal vulnerability to external manipulation.

While Sweden illustrates the growing importance of psychological defence against foreign influence and disinformation, Estonia highlights how strategic communication contributes to resilience in highly digitalized environments. Estonia has learned from repeated cyber and information attacks that resilience depends on secure digital infrastructure, public trust, and effective communication during uncertainty. Alongside investments in cyber security and decentralised digital governance, Estonia has emphasized transparent communication, digital literacy, and public awareness as essential components of resilience. In a highly digitalized society, public trust in institutions and the continuity of reliable information become critical for preventing disruption and limiting opportunities for manipulation. Estonia’s experience therefore demonstrates how strategic communication complements technological preparedness by strengthening institutional credibility, societal confidence, and resilience against hybrid threats.

Unlike the Nordic examples, which primarily demonstrate resilience-building through well-established domestic institutions and whole-of-society approaches, Armenia illustrates resilience-building in a context where domestic reforms are increasingly complemented by external support. Operating in a highly contested geopolitical environment, Armenia demonstrates how international partnerships can strengthen institutional resilience against emerging hybrid threats. Reflecting these challenges, the European Union launched the EU Partnership Mission in Armenia (EUPM Armenia) in April 2026 under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The mission aims to enhance Armenia's democratic resilience and crisis-management capacity by providing strategic advice, institutional capacity building, and operational support to government ministries and national institutions. Its mandate specifically addresses multi-layered threats, including foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI), cyber-attacks, and illicit financial flows, while promoting a horizontal whole-of-government approach to resilience. Rather than focusing exclusively on defence capabilities, the mission reflects the growing recognition that resilience in small states depends equally on effective institutions, coordinated governance, and the capacity to anticipate and respond to complex hybrid threats. In this context, Armenia demonstrates how strategic communication, institutional capacity, and resilience are becoming increasingly interconnected within vulnerable regional security environments.

Taken together, these examples demonstrate that resilience in small states depends not only on military forces, but also on effective institutions, public trust, and the ability to resist hybrid threats targeting the informational and cognitive domains. Although Finland, Sweden, Estonia, and Armenia operate in different security environments, they all recognise that resilience requires a proactive rather than reactive approach, combining institutional preparedness, societal engagement, and strategic communication. As the case studies illustrate, strategic communication contributes to resilience by strengthening public awareness, reinforcing institutional legitimacy, and reducing vulnerability to foreign information manipulation and other hybrid threats. In today's security environment, resilience is no longer simply the capacity to recover from crises; it has become a source of strategic power that enables small states to preserve political agency, democratic stability, and strategic autonomy under conditions of prolonged competition. As hybrid threats increasingly target cognition rather than territory, strategic communication should therefore be understood not merely as a supporting communication function but as an integral component of national security strategy.

For policymakers in small states, this requires institutionalising strategic communication as a core component of national security and resilience policy rather than treating it as a reactive communication function. Governments should adopt whole of society approaches that integrate strategic communication across public institutions, strengthen media and digital literacy, enhance mechanisms for identifying and responding to foreign information manipulation, and promote transparent and consistent engagement with citizens. Such measures reinforce public trust, improve preparedness for hybrid threats, and strengthen the capacity of small states to preserve democratic resilience and strategic autonomy in an increasingly contested security environment.

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By Ketevan Jakeli - Fellow of Center for Strategic Communications at the Strategic Security Initiative (SSI)

Photo: OpenAI