Switzerland Names Russia: What Bern’s New Security Strategy Says About Hybrid Attacks and Polarisation

On 18 September 2026, the Swiss government's English-language X account posted two sentences and a link. In response to the deteriorating security situation, it said, Switzerland had set three objectives, and the Federal Council had adopted its Security Policy Strategy 2026. The post drew 29.6 million views on an account where posts usually reach a few thousand people. Its post on the 1 August national day speech reached about 5,700 views. Online audience and commenters took the September post as a sign that war preparations had begun. The document behind it is no warning of war. It is a direct threat assessment, and for a neutral state it is also an attribution. The strategy names Russia as the author of hybrid attacks on the West, and it describes influence activities that polarise societies as a danger to Swiss direct democracy. Together these positions turn neutrality from a fixed doctrine into an instrument that has to be calibrated against a named adversary. 

On 27 September, Swiss voters rejected the Neutrality Initiative, which would have enshrined a stricter neutrality in the constitution, barred cooperation with defence alliances and blocked sanctions not approved by the United Nations. The result was 70.2 percent against, and every canton said no. The strategy report cannot be credited with it, because support had already fallen from 42 to 34 percent between the two SRG polls, the second taken in early September. Nor can the result be attributed to Russian activity. The State Secretariat for Security Policy (SEPOS) reported "coordinated, covert disinformation operations" during the campaign, alongside open coverage by RT DE, but said it did not believe foreign actors had a decisive impact.

Only Russia Is Treated as an Adversary

The strategy names three powers. The United States no longer regards itself as the guarantor of the world order as it was known, nor of Europe's security, and considers European defence a European responsibility. For Switzerland, the consequence is practical. The strategy sets the goal of defending jointly with partners in case of armed attack, and commits Bern to agreements with NATO and other partners by the end of 2027 to exchange air situation data. China is described as Washington's main rival, but the document judges that economic interdependence and the risks involved mean Beijing should not, for now, seek to provoke a military attack.

Russia receives the sharpest language. The report states that Moscow has placed its economy on a war footing and oriented its armed forces towards a potential confrontation with Western states. It warns that a war between Russia and NATO members could break out. It also states that "an unfavourable period is looming" for Europe, during which Russia could intensify hybrid operations or attack other European countries. Moscow might also seek to destabilise Switzerland or target its critical infrastructure to harm others. The foreword captures this logic in one sentence: what threatens Europe "also threatens Switzerland".

The strategy treats threats to neighbouring countries’ infrastructure, elections and energy supplies as relevant to Switzerland’s own security. Its concrete measures follow from this assessment rather than from any fundamental change in the immediate military threat to Swiss territory.

On defence, this approach supports preparations for joint military operations with partners in the event of an armed attack, reflecting the assessment that a conflict involving NATO’s eastern members would have direct implications for Swiss security. On intelligence, it justifies the air situation data agreements planned by 2027, since missile or drone threats detected over Poland or the Baltic states are now considered relevant to Swiss airspace rather than merely early warnings for other countries. On resilience, it extends Switzerland’s security concerns beyond its borders to the stability of neighbouring EU and NATO states, whose internal polarisation and institutional weaknesses could also compromise Swiss security.

This distinction also reflects economic realities rather than an entirely separate threat calculus. Switzerland depends on the United States and China as trading and technology partners, and the report treats both accordingly, as powers whose influence must be managed rather than directly confronted.

Russia occupies a different position. Switzerland has aligned itself with EU sanctions against Moscow since 2022, substantially restricting bilateral economic relations and reducing the economic considerations that might otherwise encourage more cautious language. The strategy can therefore identify Russia as a source of hybrid threats and a potential military aggressor more explicitly than it does Washington or Beijing.

Attribution Stops Where Polarisation Begins

The attribution is explicit when it comes to methods. The report states that Russia has used disinformation, cyberattacks, espionage and sabotage for years to destabilise Western countries. Concrete measures reinforce this assessment. The implementation calendar includes a parliamentary motion, already being implemented, to systematically expel Russian spies, alongside intelligence officers from other foreign states. By contrast, the sections on the United States and China describe a withdrawing security guarantor and a strategic rival constrained by economic ties, respectively, without portraying either as an attacker.

The passages on influence operations and polarisation are less direct. They attribute hybrid conflict "in particular" to autocratic states without naming specific countries. Similarly, the foreword states that Switzerland must defend its democratic institutions and social cohesion against attacks every day, again without identifying an actor.

The report does not explicitly connect these passages. Read together, however, they describe a common mechanism, with Russia being the only state specifically identified as conducting hybrid operations against Western countries. This is arguably the strategy’s most significant implication, although it remains an inference drawn from the text rather than an explicit conclusion of the report.

From Ukraine’s War to Switzerland’s Own Exposure

Naming Russia is not new. The 2021 security policy report already examined hybrid conflict. After the full-scale invasion, the Federal Council approved a supplementary report on 7 September 2022. It concluded that Russia had destroyed the foundations of a rules-based peace order in Europe. It also concluded that Switzerland should, while respecting neutrality, orient its security and defence policy more consistently towards international cooperation and modernise the army. Closer cooperation with NATO was possible in that reading, and membership was not.

The 2022 report adapted Swiss defence policy to the war in Ukraine. The 2026 strategy goes further, preparing for a broader European security environment in which Switzerland itself may be targeted indirectly through hybrid operations and long-range attacks, at a time when Europe can no longer assume the same level of American support.

A large-scale direct attack on Switzerland is still considered unlikely in the near future. Hybrid conflicts and long-range attacks are identified as the most probable threats in the coming years, making measures against them a declared priority.

support. A large-scale direct attack on the country is still judged unlikely in the near future. The most probable threats in the coming years are hybrid conflicts and long-range attacks, and measures against them are the declared priority.

The Threshold Problem for a Neutral State

The report defines hybrid conflict in general terms, as a combination of methods used by an aggressor to destabilise a state, undermine its institutions or bend it to its will. The definition does not identify a specific perpetrator. This allows the strategy to remain applicable beyond any single adversary, while its later sections extend the same framework to non-state and criminal actors.

Yet the report’s threat assessment leaves little ambiguity about which state most closely fits the framework. The instruments it identifies include cyberattacks, influence activities, disinformation, espionage, sabotage, economic pressure, the instrumentalisation of migration and criminal groups, and covert military operations. Several of these methods correspond directly to activities the report elsewhere attributes to Russia: disinformation and cyberattacks against Western countries, espionage serious enough to warrant parliamentary action, and broader attempts at destabilisation.

The general definition and the Russia-specific assessment therefore describe overlapping behaviour at two levels: one provides a durable framework, while the other identifies the state currently associated with several of its methods.

The report’s explanation of how these instruments operate is particularly relevant for security practitioners. Hybrid attacks remain covert for as long as possible, making it difficult to identify their authors with certainty. This ambiguity is also relevant to the Swiss referendum campaign, during which SEPOS reported covert disinformation operations alongside open coverage by RT DE. The distinction between covert and overt activity complicates attribution and the assessment of foreign influence.

Overt hybrid activities are often deliberately kept below the threshold of an armed attack, operating in a grey zone of international law. Individual actions may fall well short of that threshold, while their cumulative effects can be considerably more damaging. The targeted state must therefore determine when a series of destabilising activities has become serious enough to justify a response. The aggressor, in turn, can exploit uncertainty over precisely where that threshold lies.

For a neutral country, the threshold also has legal implications. Switzerland may cooperate militarily with other states once it considers itself attacked, making the determination of when an attack has occurred fundamental to the application of neutrality.

The report offers several reference points: an attack has occurred, an attack is imminent, or multiple coordinated attacks, such as cyberattacks or acts of sabotage, have collectively caused serious damage. The final judgement remains with the political authorities.

Countering Polarisation Without Policing Speech

The report states that influence activities often seek to portray other states as dysfunctional and to "polarise and radicalise societies". Although hybrid conflicts against European countries are not new, the report observes that their methods have become more varied and increasingly coordinated.

It further notes that these developments can strengthen parties at the margins of the political spectrum and influence election and referendum outcomes. Direct democracy is therefore both an asset and "also a vulnerability" in the face of such activities. In effect, the government has recognised referendums as potential targets of foreign influence while continuing to rely on them as a central mechanism of democratic decision-making.

The Swiss text also addresses a central argument advanced by the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in support of the Neutrality Initiative. It states that participation in sanctions backed by broad international consensus is compatible with the law of neutrality and serves Switzerland’s interests. Countering the threat is itself divisive, and the consultation showed the same fault lines the report describes. It drew 161 responses between December 2025 and March 2026. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) and neutrality organisations objected to closer ties with the EU and NATO and asked for a clearer definition of neutrality. Some parties and neutrality supporters warned against state control of opinion in the fight against disinformation. In response, the final strategy deepened its work on influence activities and added particular attention to freedom of expression and the role of rigorous journalism (DDPS, 2026). A state that names a foreign author of polarisation must persuade a divided public that naming is not censorship.

A Neutral State That Cannot Stand Alone

The strategy links Russia’s room for manoeuvre to Europe’s defence capabilities, American support and the course of the war in Ukraine. A neutral state has therefore made the outcome of that war a variable in its own security assessment.

Switzerland is neither an EU nor a NATO member and, in its own assessment, risks having to confront certain threats without the security guarantees available to alliance members. Its strategy nevertheless acknowledges that hybrid conflict and long-range attacks cannot be addressed effectively through national capabilities alone.

This conclusion has implications beyond Switzerland. When a wealthy, consensus-driven neutral democracy recognises the limits of acting independently, it also raises broader questions about Europe’s capacity to respond collectively to threats that cross national borders without necessarily reaching the threshold of conventional warfare.

Days before the vote, Parliament asked the government to prepare an effective analysis of foreign influence attempts. A revision of the Intelligence Act, with part one before Parliament in 2026, would give the intelligence service an explicit task to detect and prevent threats from influence activities.

Image: Screenshot from Security Switzerland 2026, Federal Intelligence Service (FIS), Switzerland.

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By Louis Sandro Zarandia, Associate Expert of CSC, SSI