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Mariam Megrelishvili is a Senior Expert at the Center for Strategic Communications (CSC) of the Strategic Security Initiative (SSI). She specializes in political analysis and international relations. She holds bachelor’s and master’s degrees in International Relations, as well as a master’s degree in European Interdisciplinary Studies from the College of Europe. Throughout her 14-year career, Mariam has held various key positions in both the government and private sectors. Her areas of expertise include hybrid warfare, strategic communications, and energy security.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS


Seeing the Threat, Understanding It Too Narrowly: What 9/11 Still Has to Teach NATO
Twenty-five years after the attacks of September 11, 2001, the temptation is to mark the anniversary by retelling the day itself, the burning towers, the grounded flights, the images that an entire generation absorbed before it fully understood what it was watching. That story has already been told many times over, in documentaries, congressional hearings, and the exhaustive record of the 9/11 Commission. The more useful anniversary exercise is harder: asking not what happene
Sep 10


Resilience as Power: Strategic Communication and Security in Small States
In recent years the nature of security transformed. Contemporary threats increasingly extend beyond conventional military confrontation, targeting institutions, societies, and democratic processes through disinformation, cyberattacks, political interference, and other forms of hybrid activity. Rather than seeking immediate territorial gains, such threats frequently aim to undermine public trust, weaken institutional legitimacy, and exploit societal vulnerabilities. n this con
Aug 3


A Regional Blind Spot: Closing the Cybersecurity Gap in the V4 Regional Cooperation
Péter Magyar's landslide victory over Viktor Orbán in Hungary's April 2026 parliamentary election did more than end sixteen years of Fidesz rule. It reopened a regional format, the Visegrad Four, that had been effectively dormant since Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. On June 23, Magyar hosted the prime ministers of Poland, Czechia, and Slovakia at the Grassalkovich Palace in Gödöllő for the first V4 summit in two years, declaring simply, "V4 is back." The four leade
Jul 18


Palantir's European Exits and the Unresolved Question of Strategic Autonomy
France's Prime Minister Sébastien Lecornu did not lead with cost overruns or technical failure when he announced in June 2026 that the DGSI would end its relationship with Palantir in favour of French firm ChapsVision. He led with a question of control. France, he said, could not depend on partners capable of cutting access to critical technology at will, on their own terms, for their own reasons. The concern was not hypothetical. It had just been demonstrated. Weeks earlier,
Jul 18


Scroll, Rage, Vote: TikTok as a Hybrid Threat and How the AfD and Die Linke Are Rewiring German Youth Politics
In Germany, a quiet yet rapidly developing hybrid threat is emerging: the smartphone screen. Unlike conventional warfare with tanks and troops, this could be fought with algorithms, anger, and a generation of young voters being drawn towards political extremes. TikTok, a platform owned by Chinese tech company ByteDance and used by more than 20 millions of the German population, has become the most influential space for political persuasion and manipulation in the country, par
Jul 18


Missile Defense Becomes Collective: Europe's Next Security Architecture
For years, Europe treated missile defense as a supporting capability. That assumption has changed in favor of strategic priorities. The decision by Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine and the United Kingdom to establish a defensive Anti-Ballistic Missile Coalition is more than another multinational defense initiative. It reflects a broader shift in European security thinking, one that recognizes long range missile threats as a defi
Jul 14


Beyond Sanctions: How UK-EU Coordination Is Shaping Cyber Deterrence
On July 13, the United Kingdom and the European Union unveiled their first coordinated cyber sanctions package against Russia, targeting senior intelligence officials, cybercriminals, front companies, malware operators, and disinformation actors involved in Russia's hybrid operations. Alongside the sanctions, the EU and the UK jointly attributed a cyberattack against Poland's energy infrastructure to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), while France and Germany summoned R
Jul 14


Cognitive Strikes as part of Russian Active Measures
Recently leaked internal files attributed to Russia’s Social Design Agency (SDA) have exposed a set of coordinated influence operations targeting European societies. The SDA, a Russian firm already sanctioned by the US, UK and EU for spreading “deceptive Kremlin propaganda,” operates as a contractor of the Russian Presidential Administration. The leaked documents, obtained by investigative journalists, include internal reports, planning documents and private communications be
Jul 6


When Deterrence Becomes Disruption: Nuclear Signaling as a Hybrid Threat
Nuclear influence has moved beyond its launch button and nuclear weapons no longer need to be deployed to reshape global security. A range of non-kinetic measures can now alter political calculations, generate strategic anxiety, and erode international legal frameworks without triggering the threshold of an armed conflict. Deterrence postures of Nuclear weapons states (NWSs) are also visibly changing with nuclear spending on the rise, as geopolitical competition persists, and
Jul 6


Occupied Without Annexation: Belarus Inside Russia's War Machine
On June 19, Volodymyr Zelensky issued an ultimatum, giving Alexander Lukashenko one week. Four relay stations were identified on the territory of Belarus, in the regions of Gomel and Brest, installed on communications towers, which are normally used to guide Russian Shahed and Geran drones through their final approach vectors towards Volyn, Rivne and Zhytomyr. These stations have been operating since the second half of 2025, and it was in March 2026 when intelligence communit
Jun 28


Évian G7 in Review: Russian Escalation, the U.S-Iran Memorandum, and the Road to Ankara
The 52nd G7 Summit concluded in Évian-les-Bains on 17 June 2026, but the gathering that emerged looked different from the one France had planned. Paris had hoped to focus on economic resilience, critical minerals, and artificial intelligence governance. Instead, leaders spent much of the summit responding to a rapidly changing security environment shaped by developments around Iran and Ukraine. More than any formal agenda item, these events defined the tone and outcomes of th
Jun 19


Reframing the “Post-Soviet” as a Postcolonial Condition: Rethinking Empire, Influence, and Power in Eurasia
Photo: OpenAI By Louis Sandro Zarandia When analysts struggle to explain why Georgia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Moldova or Armenia keep finding themselves at the centre of geopolitical crises, they tend to reach for familiar explanations: democratic deficiency, corruption, institutional weakness, a region caught between Russia and the West. What these explanations share, beyond their condescension, is a common blind spot. They treat the symptoms while refusing to name the disease.
Jun 18


From the Third Rome to the Burning Lavra: Religion as a Tool of Russian Power Projection
Photo: OpenAI By Megi Benia The Russian strike that damaged the Dormition Cathedral of the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra is more than an attack on a UNESCO World Heritage Site or one of the holiest places in Eastern Orthodoxy. It exposes a deeper contradiction that has long characterized Russia's relationship with religion, history, and power. For centuries, Russia has sought to portray itself as the heir to the Orthodox Christian world through the policy of the "Third Rome." Following
Jun 15


A New Hybrid Figure: CEO Diplomacy and the Changing Architecture of Great-Power Competition
Source: OpenAI By Tamar Shengelia When a semiconductor CEO travels with the president, he is no longer just a businessman. And when a rival power targets his company while he sits at the negotiating table, he is no longer just a businessman either. The Beijing summit of May 2026 revealed the emergence of a new geopolitical figure: the CEO-diplomat. The Beijing summit offered a revealing glimpse into the evolving role of the technology CEO in contemporary geopolitics, with the
Jun 14


The Shift No Longer Symbolic: Marco Rubio’s Armenia Visit and Power Dynamics in the South Caucasus
Photo: OpenAI By Megi Benia Contributors: Tinatin Gachechiladze, Mariam Gamdlishvili, Mariam Orjonikidze Wägmark On May 26, 2026, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit days before the Parliamentary election in Armenia became one of the most strategically consequential moments in recent Western engagement in the South Caucasus. Unlike previous high-level visits focused primarily on democratic reform or economic cooperation, Rubio’s visit was overwhelmingly security-orien
May 27


Ambiguity as Strategy: What the Beijing Visits Revealed About Strategic Communication and Power
Photo: OpenAI By Mariam Gamdlishvili and Ketevan Jakeli Within less than a week in May 2026, Beijing hosted both: Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. The sequence itself became part of the message. In practical terms, the visits focused on trade, security, sanctions, and geopolitical competition. Symbolically, however, they communicated something broader: China increasingly sees itself - and wants to be seen - not just as a participant in global affairs, but as the diplomatic
May 27


International Law O'Clock: Is the Prohibition on the Use of Force Meaningless?
Photo: OpenAI By Konstantina Zivla The question is no longer whether the prohibition on the use of force (Article 2(4) of the UN Charter) is technically in force - it is. The question is whether it remains meaningful in a world where three permanent members of the Security Council appear willing to abandon it, and where the Council itself is paralysed by the veto system. The short answer is: No, it is not meaningless. But it is no longer the rigid, inviolable wall it was des
May 20


The Parade That Couldn’t Perform: The Limits of Russian Symbolic Power
Photo: OpenAI By Irina Mamulashvili and Sydney Sheinfeld This year's Victory Day parade in Russia was, for the first time in nearly twenty years, devoid of tanks, armoured vehicles, and ballistic missiles. There was no internet access in Moscow. A three-day ceasefire had been negotiated via Washington in order to prevent an attack by Ukraine during the celebration of the holiday. These are not the conditions under which a state projects strength. They are the conditions under
May 14


Beyond Messaging: Strategic Communication as Statecraft
Photo: OpenAI By Mariam Gamdlishvili Strategic communication is still widely misunderstood. It is treated as messaging - something that follows policy, explains it, or, in the worst case, tries to repair it. This is not just inaccurate; it is strategically dangerous. Communication actually does not sit or set downstream of policy. It is inseparable from how policy is experienced, interpreted, and ultimately judged. Neville Bolt offers a rigorous definition of StratComms: th
Apr 28


Strategic Autonomy or Strategic Illusion: Europe's Defense Dilemma
Photo: Open AI By Tinatin Gachechiladze For the last thirty years, the concept of European strategic autonomy has been cycling between aspiration and institutional reality. The defense dilemma Europe deals with is not new, but it has never been more profound. The continent possesses solid economic weight, an industrial base, and political institutions to strengthen its own security. Regardless, it has not done so. On paper, Europe's means look formidable: European NATO allies
Apr 22


National Resilience as the First Line of Defense
Photo: AI Gemini By Megi Benia For much of the modern era, national defense was understood primarily in military terms. Security was measured through force posture, troop readiness, weapons systems, territorial control, and the capacity to defeat an external aggressor. Those elements remain indispensable. No serious state can ignore conventional defence. Yet the strategic environment has changed. Many of today’s most consequential threats do not begin with armored formations
Apr 16
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